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INEFFICIENCY OF AUTOMATICALLY LINKING











To ensure that the level of benefits keeps pace with the general
welfare development, governments sometimes fix the replacement ratio by
linking benefits automatically to private sector wage rates. In this
paper the effects of introducing an automatic link between unemploy-men~
benefits and private sector wages rates, are shown in the context of a
game between employers, an encompassing trade union federation and the
government. The by far most likely outcome of introducing such a link, is
that the unemployment rate will rise and output will be reduced, because
the incentives for the trade union federation of raising the wage rate
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1. Introduction
An important question governments face is how to set benefit levels
and how to change these benefit levels when economic circumstances such
as the level of general welfare change. Some governments have yielded to
the temptation to link benefit levels sutomatically to private sector
wage levels through index mechanisms as a simple and apparently just
answer to this question. Such benefit linking mechanisms have existed for
example in the Netherlands for over ten years (van Drimmelen ~ van Hulst
1981). Similar mechanisms car. to some extent be found in other countries.
An automatic link between unemployment benefits and real wages rates
can have rather undesirable effects however. The existence of an
automatic link between unemployment benefits and private sector wage
rates can explain the lack of wage adjustment which made the Dutch dis-
ease so painful in the Netherlands (Kremers 1986). Because unemployment
benefits were linked to the a~age rates in both the international and the
relatively flourishing domestic sector, and the minimum pay out is equal
across the sectors, the linking mechanism will have hindered the adjust-
ment of the wage rates in the international sector to changed
circumstances. This lack of wage adjustment in turn created a snow ball
effect because the unemployed resulting in the course of this process
landed on the public sector payroll in the form of genuinely unemployed
or in the form of disguised unemployed, such as many of the industrially
disabled (see Halberstadt 1978 and table 1).
Table 1. The shift from Drivate to public sector pav roll
1963 1973 1983




Number of people on the pay roll













Source: De Nederlandsche Bank Annual report 1983
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As a result public sector expenditure rose rapidly, leading to a vast
government deficit (up from OX in 1973 to 4.5x of GDP in 1979) and high
tax rates (the share of conventional non-gas taxation and social security
contributions rose from 42z to 46.5X) even though revenue from gas taxa-
tion by itself ineant an extra income of roughly 2.5X of GDP in 1979 and
5.5X in 1982). The increased tax rates and rates of social security con-
tributions aggrevated the original problems of wage adjustment by
creating an upward pressure on gross wage rates. This worsened the situa-
tion especially in the international sector, wiping out both profits and
employment (see table 2).















M Labours share equals total labour cost including employers
contributions and imputed income of self-employed, divided by
net value-added at factor costs.
Source: Central Planning Bureau, Centraal Economisch Plan, 1979,
1984
This paper studies the consequences for variables such as the rate
of unemployment and the level of output of introducing an automatic link
between the level of benefits and private sector wage rates in the con-
text of an economy where an encompassing trade union or trade union
federation exerts a major influence on wage setting. The emphasis in the
paper lies on showing the (de)merits of an automatic link between un-
employment benefits and private sector wage rates without focussing on a
specific historic context such as the one sketched above. This implies
abstraction of phenomena such as the possible coincidence of íntroducing
a benefits wage rate link at the same time as a commodity bonanza occurs,
the smoothing out of fiscal adjustment over time (e.g. deficit financing)
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or the possible mal reaction to changed circumstances by the government
or the trade union federation.
Attention is therefore focussed on the effects of an automatic
benefits wage rate link in a non-stochastic environment, because it
should be clear that in a stochastic environment it is in general not
sensible for the government to give up a policy instrument, such as the
level of benefits. An optimal reaction to unforseen events such as an
oil-price shock normally requires a change in all policy instruments.
Giving up any one instrument implies therefore that a sub-optimal mix of
instruments is used which will result in utility loss~ This is however
thought to be such an obvious point that it is not elaborated in the
paper.
The set up chosen in this paper is one in which a monopoly trade
union federation sets the wage rate first after which the firms set the
level of employment. The trade union federation can therefore be regarded
as the Stackelberg leader in the game with the firms. The trade union
federation is simultaneously involved in a non cooperative game with the
government. The trade union federation sets the wage rate in this game at
the same time the government sets the level of public sector employment,
the level of unemployment benefits and the tax rate on labour income. A
tiash solution is supposed to apply for this latter game. Both the govern-
ment and the trade union federation take each others behaviour therefore
as uninfluentiable by themselves through strategic behaviour. The
government has no direct form of interaction with the firms, though it
influences their behaviour indirectly through its effect on the wage set-
ting process. The set up is confined to one period, so the government is
bound by a simple a-temporal budget constraint. In reality governments
extend budgetary adjustments over more than one period, but abstraction
of this smoothing of changes over time does not alter the conclusions of
this paper.
In assuming an encompassing trade union which dominates the wage
setting process, the paper follows the Scandinavian tradition Calmfors
1982. 1985, Hersoug 1985 etc.), though it abstracts from open economy
phenomena. The paper strives for some more consistency than most papers
(e.g. Calmfors ~985, Sampson 1983) in the sense that not only trade union
but also government behaviour is based on explicit optimization.
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This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with the trade
union federations behaviour. Section 3 is concerned with the effect of an
automatic benefits wage rate link on the trade union federations
behaviour. Section 4 deals with the governments behaviour whereas section
5 focusses on the effect of an automatic benefits wage rate link on the
its behaviour. In section 6 attention is turned on the interaction be-
tween the governments and the trade union federations behaviour. Section
7 concludes the paper.
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2. The Trade Union Federations Behaviour
Consider the following aggregate labour demand curve,
~ - L(w) with: L'~0 (2.1)
This labour demand curve has the usual properties; labour demand ~, is
decreasing in the gross wage rate w. It results from optimizing behaviour
on the part of firms; firms that maximise their revenue function with
respect to their labour input. For simplicity it is assumed that firms
take the wage rate as given and that the trade union federation
unilaterally determines the wage rate w. This implies that the monopoly
union model is assumed to apply (61cDonald and Solow 1981).
The trade union federation cares about income and the level of
employment. Such preferences of the trade union federation allow for
various specific possibilities regarding its utility function. The trade
union federation might be supposed to maximise the wage bill wi (Dunlop
19~~). total rent, that is the surplus of income over the wage bill under
perfect competition (De Menil 19~~), or a more general Stone-Geary
utility function that allows for subsistence levels of wages and employ-
ment and the importance of supernumerary wages and employ~ent (Pencavel
1984).
Here it is assumed that the trade union federation maximises a
utilitarian utility f~lnction with respect to the gross wage rate
and subject to the labour demand curve (2.1) (McDonald and Solow 1981;
Oswald 1982a, 1985, van der Ploeg 1986),
Max U - ( ~.g)u((1-t)w) . (n-~-g)u((1-t)b), u'~0, u " ~0 (2.2)w
where n denotes the size of the labour force, b the level of real un-
employment benefits, t the labour tax rate, which can be taken to
comprise wage taxes, employers and employees social security contribu-
tions, indirect taxes and the like (see Layard and Nickell 1986) and g
denotes the number of public sector employees, which are paid competeti~~e
wages (i.e. wages which are comparable to the private sector). The ad-
vantage of this specification is that it has a micro economic foundation
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and can be derived from aggregating the preferences of two groups of
employed and unemployed workers with risk averse (u "~0) or riskneutral
(u "-0) preferences. If the level of the trade union federations member-
ship is fixed, the approach is equivalent to an expected utility
approach, where (~.g)~n is the probability of a member of the trade union
federations reference group to be employed and (n-~-g)~n the probability
to be unemployed.
The monopoly trade union federation is not just involved in a game
with the firms and their representative organization, but is also ín-
volved in a game with the government. This latter game is assumed to be a
noncooperative game where the actors adopt Nash strategies and find the
accompanying equilibrium. The trade union federation therefore maximises
its utility function given the tax rate t, the level of benefits b and
the the level of public sector employment g. This leads to the following
expression for the trade union federations behaviour provided that the
second order conditionl for an optimum is satisfied U~~O,
Uw - L'(w)[u((1-t)w) - u((1-t)b)]
~ (1-t)(~C.g)u~((1-t)w) - 0 (z.3)
Equation (2.3) expresses that the trade union federation equates the
utility loss [u((1-t)w) - u((1-t)b)), for the workers who become un-
employed L'(w), as a result of a rise in the wage rate to the marginal
gain in utility (1-t)u'((1-t)w), for the employed (~4g), of such a rise
in the wage rate. Zn other words, the union sets as a typical monopolist
a markup of u((1-t)w) over u((1-t)b) that is an inverse function of the
elasticit of demand for labour - wL wY (e~{g `g ) that the trade union
federation faces.
If the second order condition for a maximum is satisfied and a solu-
tion exists, then the model can be solved for the gross wage rate as a
function of the level of benefits, the tax rate and public sector employ-
ment,
w - W[g.b.t], W~- - Uw~~Uww (2.4)
-~-
The effects of changes in the tax rate respectively the level of
benefits on the gross wage rate can be determined from (2.3) using the
implicit function theorem (see equation (2.4) as:
Wg - - (1-t)u'((1-t)w)~U~ ) 0
Wb - (1-t)L'(w)u'((1-t)b)~U~ ~ 0
w - on
and,




(~~B){u'((1-t)w) . (1-t)wu " ((1-t)w)}~U~ (2.8)
Most of these results are well known (e.g. McDonald and Solow 1981,
Oswald 1982a, Sampson 1983? VanderPloeg 1986, Calmfors 1982).
An increase in public sector employment shifts the labour demand
curve out and reduces the absolute value of the demand for labour elas-
ticity (~eR4g~~~e~~). This reduction in the wage sensitivity of the
demand for labour elasticity makes it more attractive for the trade union
federation to raise the wage rate (W )0)3 A rise in unemployment benefitsg
reduces the gap between an employed and an unemployed member's utility
and therefore reduces the marginal opportunity cost for the trade union
federation of raising the wage. In other words the trade union federation
places, at the margin, less value on jobs than on income and consequently
demands a higher wage rate (Wb)0). A change in labour supply does not
change the desired wage, because neither the marginal benefit nor the
marginal cost to the trade un on federation from raising the wage rate
depends on the labour supply (Wn-O). A higher tax rate has an ambiguous
effect on the gross wage rate desired by the trade union federation. Note
that equation (2.4) implies that the trade union federation equates the
utility loss of the workers who become unemployed to the marginal gain in
utility for the employed. Now higher taxes reduce the first term, the
utility loss for the workers who become unemployed (wu'((1-t)w) is for
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most reasonable utility functions such u(x) - xa, aCl, larger then
bu'((1-t)b)). This makes the trade union federation emphasize the wage
rate. The effect of higher taxes on the second term, the marginal gain in
utility for the workers who remain employed, is positive if the trade
union federation is sufficiently risk averse ((1-t)w)uu,~~i-t~W~) because
a high degree of risk aversity implies that the after tax marginal
utility gain for the remaining workers goes up if the tax rate goes up.
Consequently the trade union federation will put more emphasis on a pay
rise. The degree of risk aversity is therefore decisive for the effect of
a rise in the tax rate on the wage rate desired by the trade union
federation.
The behaviour of a monopoly trade union federation facing a downward
sloping demand curve and taking the level of public sector employment,
the benefit level and the tax rate as given has been characterised in
this section. Next attention will be focussed on a trade union federation
in a similar situation except for the fact that benefits are linked
sutomatically to private sector wage rates.
-9-
3. The effect of an automatic benefits wage rate link on the trade union
federations beha~-iour
Consider now the situation where a binding law has been passed,
which can not be changed except at great political costs and which states
that unemployment benefits b, are sutomatically linked to the private
sector wage rate w. In other words the government fixes the replacement
ratio instead of the level of benefits. This changes the situation for
the trade union federation outlined in section 3 above, as follows; if
the trade union federation4 negotiates a higher gross wage rate this will
result in a higher level of benefits as well.
Maximisation by the trade union federation of its utility function
(2.2) subject to the labour demand curve (2.1), a linear link between the
the level of benefits and private sector wage rates (b-qw) and given the
tax rate and the replacement ratio q, gives5
U1 - L'(w)[u((1-t)w) - u((1-t)qw)] tw
(1-t)[(~'g)u'((1-t)w) a q(n-~-g)U'((1-t)qw)] - C (3.1)
where,
b 1-t b
q - w - (1-t)w (3.2)
and the super script 1 in UW denotes that unemployment benefits are
linked to real wage rates. Comparing this result with the 'no link'
situation described in the previous section (notably with equation (2.3))
it is clear that the markup of the net wage rate over the the net le~el
of benefits, u((1-t)w) over u((1-t)b), is now not only an inverse func-
tion of the demand for labour elasticity that the trade union federation
faces but also a positive function of the replacement ratio q and the
number of unemployed (n-~-g). The trade union federation makes the loss
of utility for the workers who become unemployed as a result of the rise
in the wage rate equal to the combined gain in utility for the employed
and the unemployed. These gains in utility result because a rise in the
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gross wage rate makes both the net wage rate for the employed and the net
level of benefits for the unemployed go up, given the tax rate. A first
impression about the difference between the behaviour of the trade union
federation in the 'link' versus the 'no-link' situation is that because
of the extra gain in utility resulting from a rise in the wage rate in
the 'link' situation, the trade union federation will set the wage rate
higher and will be better off in the 'link' situation. The correctness of
this impression will be the subject of propositions 1 and 2 discussed
below. First attention is focussed on some of the comparitive static
properties of the trade union federations behaviour and comparison of
these properties with the 'no-link' situation.
Equation (3.1) can be solved for the optimal wage rate to give
w - W1{g.9.n.t}. Wj - - Uwj,Uww (3.3)
from which the effects of changes in the variables g, q, n, and t on the
wage rate can be deduced using the implicit function theorem as,
Wg - - {(1-t)[u'((1-t)w) - qu'((1-t)qw)]}~U~ (3.4)
Wq - - {(1-t)(n-~i-g)Cu'((1-t)qw) t (1-t)4wu " ((1-t)9w)~}iUww
. {(1-t)wL'(w)u'((1-t)qw)}~U~ (3,5)
Wn - - {(1-t)qu'((1-t)qw)}~Uw~,r )0
ana,





An increase in public sector employment reduces just like in the 'no-
link' situation (equation (2.5)), the absolute value of the demand for
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labour elasticity but now such an increase reduces the gain in utility
for the unemployed resulting from the rise in the wage rate as well. For
most reasonable utility functions the first effect will dominate and the
trade union federation will increase its wage demands if public sector
employment goes up (Wg~O). A higher replacement ratio q, reduces on the
one hand the gap between an employed and an unemployed members utility
and on the other hand changes the marginal benefit for the unemployed
(q(n-1-g)u'((1-t)qw), of raising the wage rate. The first effect is posi-
tive and the latter effect is ambiguous. Again, for most reasonable sub
utility functions the first, positive, effect will dominate (Wq)0). A
rise in labour supply ceteris paribus the wage rate enlarges the number
of unemployed and makes it for the trade union federation more attractive
to raise the wage rate and thereby make the level of benefits go up
1(wn)0). A growing labour force therefore has an unbalancing effect in an
economy with a fixed replacement ratio, because it makes the wage rate go
up. A higher tax rate has an ambiguous effect on the gross wage rate in
the 'link' situation too. Higher taxes reduce the utility loss of the
workers who become unemployed as a result of a marginal rise in the wage
rate if wu'((1-t)w) is larger then bu'((1-t)b) which is the case for most
reasonable utility functions such u(x) - xa, a~l). This makes the trade
union federation put more emphasis on the wage rate. The effect of higher
taxes on the marginal gain in utility for the workers who remain employed
and the unemployed who remain unemployed is positive if the trade union
federation is sufficiently risk averse { 1 ~u "((1-t)b)) because a(1-t)w u'((1-t)w)
high degree of risk aversity implies that the after tax marginal utility
gain for the remaining workers goes up if the tax rate goes up.
Consequently the trade union federation will put more emphasis on a pay
rise. The degree of risk aversity is therefore decisíve for the effect of
a rise in the tax rate on the wage rate desired by the trade union
federation.
Comparing the outcomes of the wage setting under the 'link' situation,
described by equations (2.1) -(2.2) and (3.1) -(3.2), end the 'no-link'
situation described by equations (2.1) -(2.3), one can formulate the
following proposition about the introduction of a benefits wage rate
link.
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Proposition 1: The wage rate is set higher in the situation where there
is a positive automatic benefits, wage rates link,
if the tax rate and the level of government employment is
the same as in the sítuation where there is no such link
if the ratio of the level of benefits over the private
sector wage rate is the same as in the situation where
there is no such link
and if the second order condition for the 'no-link'
situation 1(U~~O) is satisfied for the wage rates that
solve the trade union federations wage setting problem in
both the 'link' and the 'no-link' situation, and the wage
rates lying in between these wage rates in magnitude.
See Appendix A for a proof and a more formal version of this proposition.
The result described in proposition 1 is not unexpected and conforms with
the intuitive result described earlier in this section. Since benefits
rise along with the wage level in the 'link' situation, the trade union
federation has an extra incentive to push up the wage rate.
From proposition 1 it follows suite that since the wage rate is
smaller in the 'no-link' situation, the level of employment is higher
(the demand for labour curve is downward sloping in the wage rate. From
this it follows that the unemployment rate is smaller in the 'no-link'
situation, while the level of economic activity is higher. Given the tax
rate, the net wage rate and the after tax level of benefits will be
higher in the situation with an sutomatic link between unemploymer.t
benefits and private sector wage rates. Given the tax rate and the number
of public sector employed the trade union federations utility will there-
fore be higher as well in the 'link' situation (otherwise the trade union
federation would not raise the wage rate).
But how restrictive are the conditions required for these results?
The second if condition in the proposition makes the 'link' and the 'no-
link' situation comparable. The third if condition is very likely to hold
because it just requires that the second order condition for an optimum
in the 'link' situation holds for a wage rate between the wage that
prevails in the 'link' situation and the wage rate that prevails in the
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'no-link' situation. The first if condition, that the governments be-
haviour does not change is however rather restrictive and this is the
subject of discussion of the next section. This discussion will lead to
another proposition ( proposition 2) that does not rely on this if
condition.
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4. The Governments Behaviour
The if condition in proposition 1 that the government will not
change the tax rates or the level of public sector employment if
an automatic link between benefits and private sector wage rates is in-
troduced, is not likely to hold. The fact that the number of unemployed
goes up and the level of benefits increases makes it rather unlikely that
the tax rate and the number of public sector employees remains unchanged,
because that would presumably lead to an increasing budget deficit
(increasing because of the interest payments on the deficits). More
generally an optimizing government involved in a Nash game with the trade
union federation will change the mix of its instruments if any of the
variables exogenous to its behaviour changes. The labour tax rate and the
level of government expenditures are in such a case endogenous variables
which are reduced form functions of the wage rate set by the trade union
federation, the size of the labour force and for example variables which
shift the labour demand curve but are omited here for simplicity.
In order to endogenize the tax rate and the number of public sector
employees an objective function for the government is specified in this
section. The resulting government reaction functions (or hash
strategies), will be combined with the trade union federations reaction
function (or r'ash strategy) and the labour demand curve to characterise
the reduced form effects of introducing an automatic link between un-
employment benefits and private sector wage rates.
The government is assumed to aim at reelection by caring about the
utility and perceived relations of a representative voter. The utility of
this representative voter depends on consumption of private sector and
public sector goods. Consumption of private sector goods in turn depends
on expected income from labour and on unemployment (benefits). The repre-
sentative voter is risk averse and is therefore not indifferent between
labour income and income from unemploy~ent. The perception of the
reoresentative voter about the effect of the government on its consump-
tion level is assumed to be related to the tax rate. Maximisation of the
following seperable objective function is regarded as an approximate
solution for the governments reelection problem.
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Max V(wl, g, t, bn n w)g,t,b
where,
vl)o, v2~o, v3to, v4~o, vll(0, v22~o, v33CO, v44Co
(4.1)
So the governments reelection platform consists of raising the wage bill
and thereby consumption of private sector goods, enlarging consumption of
public sector goods, increasing benefits as a percentage of real wages
(to comply with the risk aversity of the representative voter) and reduc-
ing the tax rate (to deal with the perceived negative effect of the tax
rate by the representative voter). The objective function (4.1) encom-
passes a simple 'representative consumer' objective function (V(w1' g),n nsee e.g. Turnovsky and Brock 1980). In achieving its goals the government
is bound by a budget constraint,
- tw(1{g) t ( 1-t)b(n-1-g) . gw - 0 (4.2)
This budget constraint states that tax income has to be equal to go~~ern-
ment expenditures on benefits for the unemployed and on salaries for the
public sector labour force. Note that the unemployed (n-,l-g) are granted
real gross benefits b, while the public sector employed get the same pay
as the private sector employed.
Maximisation of the governments objective function, subject to the
budget constraint (4.2), the labour demand curve (2.1) and given the wage
rate gives, provided that the bordered Hessian is positive (~H~g~O),
[w(~C.g) .b(n-i-g)~ág n t (1-t)(w-b) dt ' 0
and ,
(4.3)
[w(,~.g) .b(n-~-g)~ág W { ( 1-t)(n-~C-g) át - 0 (4.4)
which expressions can together with the budget constraint be solved for
government reaction functions, regarding the size of the public sector
labour force, the level of benefits and the tax rate,
-16-
g- G{w,n}, b - B{w,n}, t - T{w,n} (4,5)
The derivatives of these government reaction function can be determined
using the implicit function theorem and Cramer's rule. The signs of the
derivatives with respect to the wage rate can not be determined however
without further restrictions on the governments objective function (4.1)~
But determinate signs of these effects for this 'no-link' situation are
not necessary to obtain results about the effects of introducing a
benefits wage rate link because one does not need to solve for the level
of benefits as the discussion in section 6 will show. First the govern-
ments behaviour in the 'link' situation will be described however.
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5. The effect of an sutomatic benefits wage rate link on the Rovernments
behaviour
Consider again the situation where a binding law has been passed
which states that unemployment benefits b, are automatically linked to
the private sector wage rate w. This law binds the hands of the govern-
ment by making her forgo the free use of an instrument. The government
looses the level of benefits as an instrument to achieve its goals.
The governments problem is to maximise its objective function (4.1)
subject to the budget constraint (4.2), the labour demand curve (2.1) and
the constraint on its benefit setting behaviour imposed by the 'automatic
link' law (3.2). Note that the government can not use the replacement
ratio as an instrument. Solving this problem yields, provided that the
bordered Hessian is positive (~H~g)0),
[w(~.g) t wq(n-~-B)~ág n'(1-t)(w-wq) dt - 0 l5.1)
where ~- L(w) and the tax rate can be substituted using the governments
budget constraint equation (4.2). This optimality condition for the
governments behaviour (5.1) is the same as one of the optimality condi-
tions for the governments behaviour in the 'no-link' situation namely
equation (4.3), if the level of benefits in the 'no-link' situation is
set at the equilibrium level of the 'link' situation. The reason for this
similarity in outcome is that the level of benefits (b-qw) is exogenous
with respect to the tax rate and the level of public sector employment,
since the replacement ratio is fixed and the government regards the wage
rate w, as given in determining its optimal (Nash) strategy. This result
implies that if the wage rate and the ratio of benefits over the wage
rate q, is the same in the 'link' situation as in the 'no-link' situa-
tion, the government will set government expenditures and the tax rate at
the same level in the 'link' situation as in the 'no-link' situation8
According to proposition 1 however, the trade union federation will set a
different wage rate in the 'link' situation under these conditions. The
governments behaviour will therefore change after the introduction of an
automatic benefits, private sector wage rate link, firstly if the ratio
of benefits over the wage rate was fixed at a level different from the
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'no-link' situation which is obvious and second because the trade union
federations behaviour will change as a reaction to the introduction of
the 'link' law.
The optimality condition equation (5.1), the budget constraint (4.2)
and the 'link' law (3.2) can be solved to yield the (Nash) government
reaction functions for the 'link' situation,
B - G1{w,n,9}, t ' T1{w,n,q} (5.2)
of which the derivatives with respect to the wage rate can be determined
using the implicit function theorem and Cramer's rule as,
GW ' {(1-t)(1-9)w[-wL'lw)át } llt 11qATwl}~~H~g
ana,
2
TW - - zw[w(~'B) - 9(n-~-B)]aZ~IHI1
dg g
- {(1-t)2(1-q)2w2Cw(~'B) - q(n-~-B)]
(5.3)
[2w(.~.g) - 2q(n-~C-B) ' wL'(w)(1-q)]at}~~H~g (5.4)
where:
lw - t(~'g) ' Ctt(1-t)q]wL~(w) - g - (1-t)9(n-~-B) ~o (5-5)
2
A - {-(1-q)at ' (1-t)(1-q)d2} (~o)
dt
2





~H~g -- w2(1-t)(1-q)A - w2C(~'B) ' 9(n-~-g)]B ) 0 (5.8)
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In order to discuss the signs of the derivatives of the government reac-
tion functions, it is convenient to determine first the signs of some of
the effects which show up in all equations;
Iw: Iw shows how net government income reacts to a change in the wage
rate given public sector employment g, and the ratio of benefits over the
wage rate q, i.e. it shows the effect of the budget constraint. A rise in
the average wage level implies first of all extra tax revenues from ex-
isting private sector workers ~C, second a loss of tax income from the
people who become unemployed because of the rise in the wage rate, third
extra expenditures in the form of unemployment benefits for these extra
unemployed and fourth extra expenditures in the form of a higher wage
bill for the government employees and people who are already unemployed
because there salaries resp. their benefits are linked to the private
sector wage rate. The latter three effects can be shown to dominate and
an increase in the gross wage rate will therefore lead to a reduction in
r..~t government income I C0.w
jHjg : A positive bordered Hessian ~H~g is the second order condition for
the governments optimization problem in this 'link' situation and this
condition is assumed to be fulfilled. A sufficient condition for ~Fí~g to
be positive is that both A and B are negative.
If the sufficient conditions for an optimum are fulfilled (A)0,
B)0), then the government will reduce its workforce if it is confronted
with a rise in the private sector wage rate (GWCO), whereas the effect on
the tax rate is indeterminate (T1(0).w
These results follow in a plausible way from the governments objec-
tive function and its budget constraint. When the wage rate goes up the
net expenditures of the government will increase (IWCO). In order to
balance its budget, the government has to undertake corrective actions.
The government has two instruments available for corrective action, a
reduction in public sector employment and an increase in the tax rate.
(The government can not reduce benefits because it is bound by the 'link'
law, nor can it use the wage rate as an instrument because it can not in-
fluence the wage rate in a direct way.) Of the two instruments available,
the government will defenitely use the first one and cut back on public
sector employment. This happens because of the shape of the governments
utility function in which g and -t are treated as normal goods. The
reduction in tax income resulting from a rise in the wage rate has two
-zo-
opposite effects on the tax rate setting behaviour by the government. On
the one hand the government will want to raise the tax rate to make up
for the loss of tax income but on the other hand the government wants to
reduce the taxe rate since it regards the tax rate as a normal good and
as the government wants to cut back on public sector employment it will
like to reduce the tax rate as well.
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6. The interaction between the governments and the trade union federa-
tions behaviour in the benefits wage rate link situation
The interaction between the (Nash) trade union federations reaction
function and the (Nash) governments reaction function in the 'link'
situation can be graphically depicted as follows:
Figure 1. The trade union federations and the Rovernments reaction
functions
w
The point where the two reaction functions cross is the Nash equilibrium.
Note that the reaction functions exist of the points at which horizontal
respectively vertical lines are tangent to the trade union federations
respectively the governments utility function. This comes about because
the government maximises its objective function given the wage rate and
the union maximises its utility function given the size of the public
sector labour force and the tax rate. From equation (3.4) follows that it
is rather likely that the trade union federations reaction function
slopes upward, which is defenitely so if the trade union federation is
risk neutral and u(x) is x. From equation (5.3) it is clear that the
governments reaction function slopes downward if the sufficient condi-
tions for an optimum are fulfilled. It follows from the way the reaction
curves slope that both the trade union federation and the government
would benefit if the government would be the Stackelberg leader in the
underlying game.
Proposition 2: The wage rate is set higher in the situation where there
is a positive automatic benefits, wage rates link, if the
-2z-
trade union federation is risk-neutral (the sub utility
function is of the simple u(x) - x form), if the ratio of
benefits over the wage rate in the 'link' situation is set
at the same level as in the 'no-link' situation and if a
solution exists for both the 'link' and the 'no-link'
situation.
ProofB: Take the following system of equations which describes the Nash
equilibrium for the 'link' situation in case of the assumed simple ver-
sion of the trade union federations sub-utilíty function, consisting of
the optimality conditions (3.1) and (5.1) for the trade union federations
respectively the governments behaviour and the budget constraint (4.2)
(note that (u'(w)-1),
llt UW - L'(w)~w - qk'~ }~(~'B) { 9(n-~-B)) ' x- 0
~(~'g)'q(n-~-B)~ ag n ' (1-t)(1-q) ái - 0




where ~- L(w) according to equation (2.1). This system of equations
determines the equilibrium values of the wage rate, the level of public
sector employment g, and the tax rate t, in terms of the exogenous vari-
ables q and n(respectively the ratio of benefits over the wage rate and
labour supply) for the 'link' situation provided that x is nil. In case
of the 'no-link' situation x--q(n-~-g) and q- W Denote the equi-
librium values of the endogenous variables in the 'no-link' situation as
b
bN, wN, tN, BN, and ~N. If x--q(n-~N-gN) and q- WN, then the system of
equations (6.1) -(6.3) will replicate the equilibrium values bN, wN, tN.
gN, and ~N. Starting from these values for x and q, the effects of intro-
ducing an automatic benefits, wage rate link on the endogenous variables
b, w, t, g, and ~, can be computed by calculating the effects of a fixed
b
impulse dx with the magnitude WN(n-~N-gN) on the above system of equa-
N
tions, while keeping the exogenous variable n constant. The system of
equations can be solved for the following reduced form equations,
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Using the implicit function theorem and Cramer's rule, the effects of
b
introducing an automatic benefits, wage rate link at ratio N,can there-wN
g- Gs{n}, w- Ws{n}, t- Ts{n}, (6.4)
fore be calculated from,
as,
d ~J.~z
~ - , yE{w,g,t}, zE{x,n},dz - ~
~H~1





Gx - - ~ (G




where, I, A, B and ~H~g are described by equations (5.5) -(5-8) and.w
C - -Lw(~-g) t q(n-~C-g)~(1-q)L'(w)ág ~0 (6.9)
~J~ - U~~H~g - (1-q)C - (1-q)B (~0) (6.io)
The first term in ~J~ is the multiple of U~ and ~H~g. As U~ is the
second order condition for the trade union federations maximisation
problem in the 'link' case and a positive bordered Hessian ~H~g, is the
second order condition for the governments maximisation problem in this
case the first term will be negative. The second term is negative as well
and the third term is negative too if the sufficient conditions for the
governments maximisation problem are satisfied (A(0, B~0).
If the necessary and sufficient conditions for the trade union
federations respectively the governments optimization problem are ful-
filled (A~O, B(0, U~~O) and ~J~ and ~H~g are therefore negative resp.
positive, then an increase in x has a positive effect on the wage rate
(WX)0) and a negative effect on public sector employment (GX)0). In other
words the effect of introducing a benefits wage rate link on the wage
rate is positive and on public sector employment it is negative.
It follows suite from proposition 2 that under the stated condi-
tions, the introduction of a benefits wage rate link will lead to a
reduction in private sector employment (L'(w)(0), whereas the level of
benefits will go up (from b- qw) and the unemployment rate will
increase. The effect on the tax rate is indeterminate, just like the ef-
fects of a change in the tax rate on the trade union federation and the
governments reaction functions.
The economics of these results are similar to the economics of
proposition 1. in as far the trade union federations behaviour is
concerned. Introduction of the benefits wage rate link changes the oppor-
tunity costs for the trade union of increasing the wage rate given the
tax rate and the level of government employ~ent. In the proposition which
is now under discussion this ceteris paribus condition is dropped. The
effect of a higher wage rate on the governments behaviour is to reduce
its net income (Iw~O) and make the government cut back on expendíture on
government employment (ATw t C(0). This will happen because of the shape
of its utility function which treats g and t as normal goods. The reduc-
tion in tax income resulting from a rise in the wage rate will have two
opposite effects on the tax rate setting behaviour by the government.
First a sort of income effect. Tax rates will rise to make up for the
loss of tax income and second as taxes~are regarded as a normal good they
will go down for the same reasons the government will cut back on public
sector employment. The positivity of ~J~ ensures that the interaction of
trade union and government behaviour will not lead to perverse effects.
It excludes the possiblity that the ceteris paribus g and t rise in the
wage rate set by the trade union federation will lead to such a large
reduction in government employment that the trade union federation will
in effect reduce the wage rate and the government in effect substantiall~-
increases public sector employment.
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7. Concluding remarks
This paper studies the consequences for variables such as the rate
of unemployment of introducing an sutomatic link between the level of
benefits and private sector wage rates in the context of an economy where
an encompassing trade union or trade union federation exerts a major in-
fluence on wage setting. lt is shown that an automatic link between
benefit levels and private sector wage rates influences a rational trade
union federations behaviour because it increases the incentives for the
trade union federation to negotiate higher wage rates; benefits for the
unemployed will go up if the trade union federation negotiates a higher
wage rate. In reaction to such a change in the trade union federations
behaviour a rational government will change its behaviour as well. A rise
in the private sector wage rate will lead to a reduction in net tax in-
come over net expenditure. The government will react to the worsened
budget situation by cutting its expenditure on public goods and by chang-
ing its tax rates. The overall effect of introducing an automatic link
between benefit levels and private sector wage rates at the going ratio
between benefits and private sector wage rates will be that the gross




0. A major reason for which the fixing of an instrument would result in a
welfare improvement would be if one could thereby avoid or reduce the
inefficiencies resulting From a time inconsistency problem (for ex-
ample by fixing the money stock in Barro and Gordon 1983), but a time
inconsistency does not seem to arise in the context discussed in this
paper.
1. The second order condition for the unions optímization problem can be
written as:
U~ - L"(w)[u((1-t)w) - u((1-t)b)] t 2(1-t)L'(w)u'((1-t)w)
t (1-t)2(~ag)u~,((1-t)w)
with: U~CO if L " (w)CO
A sufficient condition for a maximum is that the second derivative of
the demand for labour function is negative, i.e. that the demand for
labour curve is concave to the origin in the relevant area.
2. Sampson obtains, after allowing for different formulations, a
defenitely positive sign for the effect of a change in the tax rate on
the wage rate set by the trade union federation . This comes about
because Sampson uses the net wage rate as the optimizing instrument
for the trade union and not the gross wage rate, which seems more ap-
propriate, since the trade union federation has no control over the
tax rate end wage contracts with tax clauses are not generally ob-
served.
3. The general idea behind the choice of the set up presented above is
that firms are thought to be organized in an employers organization,
that negotiates the wage rate with the trade union federation, but has
no power over the demand for labour of its members and therefore can
not use the aggregate demand for labour as an instrument in the nego-
tiations. The employees are organized through their trade unions in
the trade union federation. This federation is seen to be very power-
ful in the wage negotiations, because it can employ a domino strategy
to convince the firms to accept its wage claims. By way of simplifica-
tion the trade union federation is therefore assumed to possess all
the power in the wage negotiations. Note that this latter assumption
does not make a difference for the outcome if 1) the bargaining con-
cept is independent of the variables in the model. For example the
bargaining power coefficient in the generalized Nash bargaining solu-
tion is fixed or exogenous with respect to the model variables and 2)
if the monopoly union solution used in this paper or another exogenous
bargaining threshold and for example tge intersection of the labour
demand and supply curve are used as bargaining thresholds.
4. This effect will only be present in case of a centralized trade union
or trade union federation. If trade unions are organized in a
decentralized fashion, they will regard the benefit levels as ex-
ogenous and will not change their behaviour.
5. The second order condition for the optimization problem for the trade
union federation in the benefits, wage rate link situation is,
U~ - L " (w)[u((1-t)w) - u((1-t)qw)]
t 2(1-t)L'(w)[u'((1-t)w) - qu'((1-t)qw)]
4 (1-t)2[(~.g)u~~((1-t)w) i 92(n-~-g)u.,((1-t)qw) CO
with: U~CO if L"(w)CO and [u'((1-t)w) - qu'((1-t)qw)] CO
6. Substitution of the government budget constraint in a símple private
sector budget constraint shows that consumption of private sector
goods is directly related to w~.
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7. The reason for this result is among other things that an increase in
the wage rage is on the one hand likely to reduce the governments net
tax income over expenditures which makes her apt to cut back on expen-
diture on benefit levels and on the other hand will reduce the b~w
ratío and will therefore make the government more willing to spend
more on benefits. The solution to this dilemma and other dilemmas the
government faces depends on the form of its objective function,
notably the relative magnitude of the first versus the second order
derivatives. Because of the simultaneous nature of equations (3.3) and
(3.4) dilemmas for one variable will effect the result for an other
variable.
8. T'he proof is a complicated comparative static proof. The impulse is a
change in the nature of the system (the change from the 'no-link' to
the 'link' situation) instead of a change in an exogenous variable.
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
Denote with the letter 1 the solution to the wage setting problem in
the 'link' situation as defined by equations (2.1) -(2.2) and (3.1) -
(3.2). and denote with the letter N the solution to the wage setting
problem in the 'no-link' situation as defined by equations (2.1) -(2.3).
Definition: Z - L'(w)[u((1-t)w) - u((1-t)qw)]
- (1-t)[(~4g)u'((1-t)w) ` q(n-.~-g)u'((1-t)9w)] ' x - 0
where: .l - L(w)
Proposition 1: wN C wl if UwwCO v wEW{wN,...,wl}, t1-tN, n1-nN and
g1-g,~
Proof: It follows that q has to be substituted by
~ and x--(1-t)q(n-i-g)u((1-t)b)CO in the 'no-link' situation,
N
while x- 0 in the 'link' situation. Z is a function of the
wage rate w and the variables t, g and n. Holding these latter
three variables constant, Z will increase with a rise in the wage
rate w if the partial derivative dZ is negative, in other words
áw
if the second order condition for a maximum for the trade union
federations 'no-link' problem is satisfied in the relevant area
dZCO is equivalent to U~CO. Now if one starts from the 'no-
dw
link' situation and its solution wN and introduces a benefits wage
rate link at level bN- qwN, then it is clear from xC0 in the 'no-
link' situation and x-0 in the 'link' situation that this
constitutes a positive impulse to Z. To reach the new equilibrium
where Z-0 again the wage rate has to go up since the other vari-




What makes this proposition interesting is ofcourse that the if condition
is very likely to hold. A negative U~ in wl is a condition for the ex-
istence of a maximum for the trade union federations optimization
problem. The propositions require only a marginally stronger condition,
namely that U~ is positive in the area between wl and wN as well.
-31-
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